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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL: GREAT POWERS
INTERACTING WITH TRIBAL SOCIETIES AND WEAK
NATION-STATES**

by

Christopher E. Cooper

December 2009

Thesis Advisor:

Second Reader:

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**THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL: GREAT POWERS INTERACTING WITH
TRIBAL SOCIETIES AND WEAK NATION-STATES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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(SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT)**

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ABSTRACT

Over the last 350 years, nation-states have interacted via international norms and institutions that were nurtured under the principles of Westphalian nation-statehood. In the aftermath of the Second World War (1939–1945), the U.S.-led West created an international system based upon the interactions of developed nation-states. New nation-states formed in colonial lands when their European overseers departed. These new nation-states tried to adhere to the Westphalian ideals, but many of them were nation-state in name only. The controlling entities were not the nation-state's governing bodies; the controlling entities were the tribal societies beneath the surface. Great powers have continued to work with these hollow governments and/or tribal societies with little to no success. In order to achieve positive policy results, great powers must adjust their interactions and expectations when dealing with tribal societies and/or weak nation-states.

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I. INTRODUCTION

United States (U.S.) author and journalist, Max Boot, describes in *Savage Wars of Peace* how in “many ways the chaotic post-Cold War environment resembles that of the post-Napoleonic world...”¹ According to Boot, the premier role that Great Britain played in the post-Napoleonic world transferred to the U.S. in the post-Cold War world. If this is the case, then how does the U.S. control nations and nation-states throughout the world? The short answer is by creating a framework of alliances and international organizations (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations, U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance etc); the U.S. looks to legitimately control those inside and outside the sphere of influence via these international organizations. The problem arises when the U.S. engages nation-states not capable of working within the U.S.-led international system. If the U.S. is not able to influence nation-states operating outside the international system, then how does the U.S. control them? Since the U.S. today finds itself in a situation similar to that of Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the following thesis uses two case studies involving Great Britain to review and analyze any lessons that may be learned for exerting control in international system.

Chapter II looks at British interactions with American Indians (Amerindians) in North America. The British sought to expand their interests in North America by trying to control the local inhabitants. Keeping with the British experiences, Chapter III moves across the globe to South Asia. This chapter reviews the British experience in India. In India as in North America, Great Britain sought to expand its control in order to further its national and commercial interests. The thesis concludes, in Chapter IV, with a review and analysis of the materials presented in Chapters II and III. Chapter IV seeks to take the two British case studies (colonial North America and India) that are not compared against each other, to extract potential guidelines for U.S. involvement in

¹ Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of America Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), xx-xxi.

similar situations. Before proceeding to the case studies, one must first stop and ask the questions “what is control?” and “what is legitimacy?” The answers to these questions establish the framework for the discussion later in this thesis.

Since the word ‘control’ has many connotations, the idea of social control is the best fit when discussing ruling over or influencing others. The *World of Sociology* textbook defines social control as “the capacity of a society to regulate itself according to established principles and values [Social Control] typically refers to ideological rather than physical constraint.”² The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* expounds further with the notion that social control is “any influence exerted by society upon the individual.”³ The influence exerted by society transpires from the customs and social interactions a society consciously and subconsciously agrees to honor. The underlying purpose of social control is to establish rule and order to thwart “man’s tendency to pursue his self-interest to the point of war of all against all...”⁴

Social control, as a term and concept, conjures negative images for most Americans. The idea alludes to George Orwell’s novel *1984*; this novel describes a society where the rule and control come from a totalitarian regime. Although this is one possible outcome of social control, there are many other possibilities. Societies can control their members through their social interactions and via institutions (e.g., family, marriage, religion). U.S. sociologist Charles H. Cooley (1864–1929) explains how group experiences simultaneously provide for the development of an individual and of a society. These group experiences give the individual a “fundamental orientation to life,” and the society “its model for integrated living.”⁵ Additionally, one learns from one of the founders of American sociology, Edward A. Ross, that social control can be divided into two types: ethical and political. An ethical system of control refers to a moral order

² Joseph M. Palmisano, *World of Sociology*. (Detroit: Gale Group, 2001), 599.

³ Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman and Alvin Saunders Johnson, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930; 1935, 624.

⁴ David L. Sills and Robert King Merton. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 14:382. One should also note that the term social control is an American term but European sociologists use similar terms to describe the idea of providing order to humanity via social constraints.

⁵ Sills and Merton. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 3:380.

which one sees reflected in public opinion, religion, art, suggestion, etc. A political system of control is more closely associated with polices based on law, ceremony, education, etc.⁶ Combining these two systems of control, societies not only develop guidelines for their members' interactions, they create methods of governance. This yields a notion that a nation is the product of each society's specific systems of control (ethical and political).

Some nations continue to develop into nation-states. A state is "a structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer society and extract resources from it."⁷ Consequently, a nation-state comprises "a political community whose territorial and juridical boundaries coincide with the boundaries of a nation."⁸ The nation creates the state in its image to better and more effectively manage its members. As the nation establishes a state, it must choose what type of political system or regime should govern its people. A regime is "the formal and informal organization of center of political power, and of its relations with broader society. [A regime determines] who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not."⁹ Some examples of different regime types are republics, dictatorships, and tribal councils. The regime simply describes the "principles, institutions, and procedures that constitute the political system."¹⁰ It is a government that operates the society's chosen regime type. Government refers to the "organizations and

⁶ Edward Alsworth Ross, *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order*, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), <http://books.google.com/books?id=OPRY6Ou3Mm8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=social+control#>, (accessed September 4, 2009), 411.

⁷ Robert Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy." *World Politics* 42(1990): 428 as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah. *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 26.

⁸ Uri Ra'anan, "The Nation-State Fallacy" *In Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, edited by Joseph V. Montville Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990, 5, as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah. *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 26.

⁹ Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime" 428 as cited in Alagappa, Political, 27.

¹⁰ Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27.

people charged with the duty of governing.”¹¹ Theoretically, government must try to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people; without this legitimacy, the society might seek a new government and/or regime to coordinate their societal interactions.

This leads to a discussion of legitimacy. As defined by German sociologist Max Weber, legitimacy is “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”¹² Legitimacy emerges when the society accepts governance by the rulers, and the rulers acknowledge the society’s acquiescence to their governing. The agreement between the governors and the governed is not a static process. As Muthiah Alagappa explains in *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia*, “legitimation of power is an interactive and therefore dynamic process among the government, the elite groups, and the politically significant public...” Alagappa bases legitimacy upon four key elements: “shared norms and values; conformity with established rules for acquiring power; proper and effective use of power; and consent of the governed.”¹³ From these four elements, government and the people create the balance necessary to provide order to social interactions. Without this balance, people will seek methods by which to right the relationship i.e., via resistance, revolution, compliance etc. As contacts and interactions between nations became more and more frequent, nations themselves engage in social interactions and develop social controls to guide their international relations.

For the purposes of this discussion, the thesis divides the world into two societal types: modern and traditional. By no means are all societies either one or the other; but in order to better understand the misfit between traditional societies and the modern interactional social system, one needs to put all societies in one or the other camp. How a

¹¹ S.E. Finer, *Comparative Government*. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), 3-4 as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27.

¹² Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Edited by Talcott Parsons. (New York: Free Press, 1964), 382 as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 11.

¹³ Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27.

society is categorized, depends on its interactions and rules, not on the technologies it possesses. A society does not become modern because it utilizes modern equipment, i.e., farming equipment, radios, weapons, etc.

Sociologists compare and contrast traditional societies (ts) and modern societies (ms), based on five characteristics: affectivity (ts) vs. affective neutrality (ms); collective (ts) vs. self-orientation (ms); particularism (ts) vs. universalism (ms); ascription (ts) vs. achievement (ms); and diffuseness (ts) vs. specificity (ms).¹⁴ In addition to the above characteristics, one also needs to know the differences between the two society's economies, cultures, and politics. Let us pause for a moment to remind ourselves that the following is not about absolutes; the concepts of economy, culture, and politics are not identical across all modern societies or all traditional societies. There are, however, underlying concepts shared by all in each category. That being said, one looks to understand why some traditional societies have not become, or become comfortable in, nation-states.

Here it is important to refer back to economy, culture, and politics. The social structures in traditional societies are based on family units. So are the economic and political structures. There are no banks, corporations, political parties, etc; decisions, instead, "tend to be made by...the head of the family..."¹⁵ In regard to the economy, people tend to live at the subsistence level. They do not organize or implement more efficacious methods by which to increase production. Their mode of production reinforces the traditional social structure. Individuals work and receive compensation based upon their societies. Individuals do not have divided loyalties split between their tribal/household leaders and their ruler/employer because tribal leaders and

¹⁴ Monte Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development: An Introduction to Politics of the Developing Areas*, (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1989), 58. Palmer defines the following as: affectivity- to view others in emotional terms colored by personal values, affective neutrality- to accept other individuals and institutions as neutral...willing to play by the rules, collective- to sacrifice personal values for the sake of the community good, self-orientation- compliance due to fear of being humiliated or punished, particularism- to favor family , clan or tribe, universalism- to uniformly apply rules to all individuals, ascription- to accord status or authority based on age, sex, lineage , achievement- to grant status and authority based on demonstrated ability , diffuseness- to interact based upon norms and not by explicitly defined codes, and specificity- to interact based upon laws that are codified and sharply defined, 59–62.

¹⁵ Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development*, 62.

rulers/employers are the same people; there is no real surplus for them to control. Wealth is not concentrated but is redistributed. There is thus little reason for members to challenge existing authorities.¹⁶

Typically, members of traditional societies become “socialized to view existing relationships as inspired by tradition and sanctified by the supernatural.”¹⁷ A key to understanding these societies is that the needs and desires of the group come before the needs of the individual. Compliance is policed by one’s family. A transgression by one member becomes a transgression that affects the entire family. Understanding such core beliefs and values should make it clear just how hard it is to change social norms in traditional societies. If one cannot wait for societies to slowly adjust on their own, what might modern societies do to speed up or circumvent the process?

In *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, Lord Fredrick Lugard suggests a potentially ideal method. One does need to review Lugard’s work, published in 1922, *The Dual Mandate*, which reflects many of the accepted, but nonetheless racist, theories of its day. Such blatant racism, however, does not have to detract from Lugard’s observations about methods of social control. His underlying notion is that modern societies can best control traditional societies through “continuity, decentralization [of the controlling government]…[and] co-operation between every link in the chain…[i.e.] government and commercial community, and … provincial staff and the native rulers.”¹⁸ He describes how one should use this as a guide during all interactions. Its applicability depends on the traditional societies’ existing norms and interactions.

Lugard offers three methods of native rule: First is self-government, which is European and American style governance. Second is self-government under a native ruler with non-native councilors and administrators. Third is rule by a native chief unfettered in the control of his people but subordinate to control by of the protecting

16 Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development*, 63.

17 Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development*, 64.

18 Lord Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, (Hamden, Ct: Archon Books, 1965), 193.

power (e.g., Britain).¹⁹ These three categories offer the baseline from which to devise control for established, traditional societies. With this understanding of control, legitimacy, and types of social control, the thesis now proceeds with the two case studies and will return to these ideas and concepts in Chapter IV.

19 Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 194-197.

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II. GREAT BRITAIN IN COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European powers expanded the territorial claims of their empires. The Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British sent forth their explorers, traders, and conquerors to acquire new lands and to subdue the people of these new lands. The goal was to accumulate more wealth for the coffers of the homeland, as well as wealth for the men gaining these imperial resources. The powers' representatives encountered native peoples who had to interact with them and with all of their neighbors. One vivid example lies in the interaction between the British and the Amerindians of colonial North America.

In order to understand the interaction between British colonists and Amerindians, one must first look at the historical context. Both Great Britain and France, colonized North America around the same time (early 1600s). French settlers established their colonies around the North American Great Lakes region. As described in *The Middle Ground*, Richard White tells how “Frenchmen who traveled into the pays d’en haut [upper country]...thought they were discovering new worlds.”²⁰ Instead of discovering uninhabited forests, the French encountered the native people. In order to survive and later prosper, the French engaged the Amerindians in cultural and commercial exchanges.

In contrast, the British concentrated their settlements along the eastern seaboard of North America. The British, too, learned that they must interact with the local people in order to establish new settlements in this foreign world. Over the next eighty years (1607–1689), both sets of Europeans went from needing Indians for survival to using Amerindians to further their imperial gains.

The importance of 1689 in North America is that it marked the beginning of the four French and Indian Wars that changed the balance of European power on the America continent (as well as in the world). These four wars were King William’s (1689–1697), Queen Anne’s 1702–1713), King George’s (1744–1748) and the Seven Year Wars

²⁰ Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1.

(1754–1763).²¹ The conflicts’ participants in the colonies and along the frontiers of North America mirrored those on the European continent. The fighting and subsequent peace determined who would control the balance of power in Europe.

At the conclusion of the final French and Indian War (the Seven Year Wars), Great Britain emerged as the victor and became the supreme European power in North America. Now the British had to control not only their Amerindian allies, but also all the Amerindians in eastern North America. Unfortunately, the British had the desire, but not the authority or the appropriate methods, by which to do so.

Before one understands the methods of control used by the British after the French and Indian Wars, one must look at the beginnings of Amerindian-European relations. Much like the Europeans, the Amerindians were divided among many nations; but, unlike the Europeans, most of the Amerindians did not have states to help them unify and control their many clans, villages, and tribes. The exception to this was the Iroquois under the Great League of Peace and Power, and the Iroquois Confederacy. The Great League and the Confederacy were composed of the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas (the Five Nations). The Great League’s purpose was to “perpetuate peace among its member nations,” while the Confederacy’s purpose was to “deal with European colonists and with Indian societies outside the [Great] League.”²² The Iroquois attitude toward diplomacy set the stage for the rise of the Five Nation power block.

In the early 1600s, Dutch settlers traded muskets for fur with the Iroquois; these advanced weapons gave the Iroquois a decisive advantage over their neighbors. The Iroquois embarked on a campaign to subdue neighboring tribes in order to incorporate all Indian nations into the Great League. Some tribes complied while others fled west into the pays d’en haut or Great Lakes region. Those Algonquian who fled west sought protection from the French. This forced assimilation by the Iroquois stopped in 1664

²¹ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 11. This thesis uses the Anglo-American names for the French and Indian Wars.

²² Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 12.

when the Dutch lost New Netherland to the English.²³ When the Dutch left so did their steady supply of arms. With this, the stage and the actors were set for the events that would decide the fate of North America. The initial sides pitted the British and Iroquois alliance against the French and western Algonquian alliance.²⁴

Each imperial power took a different approach towards its alliance. The French took a fatherly approach toward the western Algonquian. France not only used colonial officials, it also used missionaries and fur traders to aid in the interactions with the Algonquian.²⁵ The focal point of the French alliance structure was that its representatives (officials, priests, and traders) assumed a fatherly attitude. In *Crucible of War*, Fred Anderson explains that:

Algonquian fathers did not discipline their children but sought to create harmony, their real power stemmed from the ability to give gifts and mediate disputes; fathers might persuade but could not seek to exert direct control without forfeiting their moral authority.²⁶

Richard White further amplifies this idea in *The Middle Ground* when he describes the French-Algonquian alliance. White tells how Algonquian tribes “responded when [the French colonial governor] summoned them...” to defend French interests against the British and/or the Iroquois.²⁷ These allied tribes answered the French call to arms because the French governor was their benefactor. His position was that of a benevolent father of all the Algonquian people, not a ruler. His primary means of control were peaceful; the French would provide goods for trade as well as presents to earn favor. Only when “faced with disobedient children did [the French] appear armed and angry.”²⁸ The demonstrations of force were made by both French soldiers and other Algonquian

²³ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 14.

²⁴ Western Algonquian consisted of Hurons, Petuns, Neutrals, and Eries. There were also many other tribes that joined the four mentioned above to gain a full list and description see White’s *The Middle Ground* 1- 49.

²⁵ W. J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 40 (1983): 342-362, <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed March 2, 2009).

²⁶ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 15.

²⁷ White, *The Middle Ground*, 142.

²⁸ White, *The Middle Ground*, 142.

warriors. The purpose of these combined demonstrations of force was to reinstate peace, so the tribe people would resume their daily lives.

Over time, however, the alliance slowly degraded because how the French saw a father and how the Algonquian saw a father ultimately diverged. An Algonquian father “mediated more often than he commanded [he] forgave more than he punished [and he] gave more than he received.”²⁹ This frustrated the French because fulfilling these expectations took time and were too costly. French in Canada preferred a Franco-Algonquian alliance that more closely mirrored their European alliances.

Unlike the French, the British acted less like benefactors and more like arms suppliers. The British alliance with the Iroquois was similar to that with other European nation-states. The British and the Iroquois Confederacy created a “commercial and strategic alliance, the Covenant Chain...”³⁰ This alliance renewed British hostilities with the French and supplied the Iroquois with the necessary arms and support to renew their attacks on the Algonquian in the pays d'en haut. The British viewed the relationship more as that between a superior and an inferior nation.

The British goal was similar to that of the French: to use the native tribes to expand control over local lands and resources. The difference lay in the means they used. The British sought to minimize imperial costs by leveraging the local population. This was possible when the British first arrived on the continent because the Iroquois had already organized themselves into the Five Nations and the Confederacy. The organized Confederacy coupled with advanced weaponry, muskets, and iron tools, gave the British a powerful ally capable of doing its bidding. This plan worked for about seventy years.

In 1689, when hostilities between the British and the French reignited in North America, the western Algonquian were organized, armed, and led by the French. The Iroquois continued with their old battle plan. At first, this was effective, but over time the French settlers and regular troops proved able to fight back. Their resolve

²⁹ White, *The Middle Ground*, 143.

³⁰ Anderson, *The Crucible of War*, 14.

strengthened their alliance with the western Algonquian.³¹ Because the British method of support was logistics only, the Iroquois did not have British soldiers fighting alongside them.³²

At the conclusion of King William's War (1689–1697), the Great Nations realized “that the [British] were incompetent military allies...”³³ With this realization, the Iroquois came to two conclusions: the British “had always sought to make use of them merely to serve [their] ends [and] the Iroquois had now to abandon all hope of ever driving the French out of Canada.”³⁴ How to deal with these realities splintered the Iroquois between rival factions, Anglophilic, Francophile, and neutral. The rival factions’ leaders were eventually able to resolve the issues and to conclude an internal truce. This internal truce led to truces by the Confederacy with both the British and the French. The Confederacy renewed its Covenant Chain with Britain, but it also agreed with the French to remain neutral in future Franco-British conflicts.

Playing the two European empires off one another worked to the Iroquois’ advantage. Both France and Britain saw them as a crucial counterbalance that if lured into the enemy’s camp would lead to disastrous results. As a result, each side graciously compensated the Iroquois; the Iroquois understood this and used their neutrality to gain power and influence, as well as expand their control over other Indians further to the south (e.g., the Cherokee and Catawbas).

During the next two wars between France and Great Britain (Queen Anne’s War 1702–1713, and King George’s War 1744–1748), the Iroquois were able to “drag their feet” and/or “side step” committing themselves. This inaction did not cause France or Britain to break relations with the Iroquois. However, what was a near perfect situation for the Iroquois would not last forever. In the fourth and final French and Indian War (Seven Years War 1754–1763), friction was such that Britain and France entered into a

³¹ Eccles, “The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism.” 344.

³² The British colonials fought the French and its allies, but Anderson, Eccles and White detail in their respective works how the Iroquois felt let down by the British officials.

³³ Anderson, *The Crucible of War*, 15.

³⁴ Eccles, “The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism.” 343–44

zero-sum game. Each country viewed everything through the prism of having others as enemies. The Iroquois were forced to choose sides. Given the outcome of this war, Great Britain's triumph, the British believed they had a freehand in North America.

This perceived free hand, however, was in fact tied to the natives. The British badly misread the situation in the *pays de haut*. It turned out the Iroquois never controlled the Algonquians to the extent the British were led to believe. No single entity absolutely controlled all of the Algonquian tribes in the *pays d'en haut*; nor were the Algonquian ready for anyone (European or Amerindian) to try. At the same time, just because the Algonquian had not previously been unified, did not mean they would not try to band together in the face of Anglo settlers' encroachment onto their lands. The problem was intra-tribal rivalry prevented one true leader from stepping up. According to White:

The inability to unite against the British was only one sign of the underlying divisions of the *pays d'en haut*. Without the French, groups of associated villages, such as the ones at Detroit or along the Ohio, became planets without a sun. There was nothing to keep them in their orbits and they collided and clashed. They betrayed one another to the British, and eventually they fought.³⁵

This disunity initially gave the British the upper hand and should have led to their ultimate control over the tribes in this region. The British could have assumed the role of father to the Algonquians that was abandoned by the retreating French. But they did not. Instead of acting like a father or even like a brother as the Algonquians expected, the British behaved like conquerors. The people and their lands were spoils of war won from the French in battle and solidified by treaty (Treaty of Paris 1763).³⁶ The British returned to running their colonial assets as efficiently as possible. In order to do this, they reduced the amount of gifts given and gunpowder sold. Additionally, the British provided little to no aid when the Algonquians faced crop failures, famine, and other medical issues. White conveys how all Algonquians felt by relating a story about a party of Mingos who

³⁵ White, *The Middle Ground*, 274.

³⁶ The Treaty of Paris in 1763 acknowledged the British gains and "control" achieved in 1760 with the battle of Restigouche and subsequent French loss of Montreal (1760).

approached the local British commander for aid to their sick and undernourished women and children. The British failed to render aid, which further enraged the Amerindians.³⁷ The irate Algonquian no longer viewed the British as indifferent rulers; they began to consider them enemies. The British failure to nurture and to develop a balanced and peaceful relationship with the Algonquian led to “calls for revolt...and nostalgia for [the French Colonial government]—the good father who had united his children.”³⁸

British policies influenced the ascension of new nativist leaders who were part of an Indian spiritual movement. These nativists believed the only way to regain favor with the “Great Spirit” was to return to the “old ways” by renouncing all things associated with Europe; this renunciation included resistance to the increasing number of Anglo settlers encroaching on the pays d’en haut. The conflagration started when the Algonquians (led by an Ottawa war leader named Pontiac) laid siege to the British garrison at Fort Detroit.³⁹ With little to no prior coordination with other neighboring Algonquian tribes, Pontiac’s siege of Fort Detroit inspired a rebellion that resulted in the British losing all but their three of the largest pays d’en haut forts (Detroit, Niagara, and Pitt).

Once again, the British leadership did not fully understand the issue at hand as they sent forces to subdue the revolt. The British felt that in order to subdue the rebels they must increase their direct control. Anderson helps explain the flaw in this logic, identifying British sovereignty as “the root, not the solution, of the [Amerindian] problems.”⁴⁰ The tighter the British pulled the reins the more fiercely the Algonquians bucked. The Algonquians were accustomed to the French style of rule. The French were not viewed as rulers, but as “fathers” and trade partners. The Algonquians were perplexed about why their French “fathers” had abandoned them to the British.

³⁷ White, *The Middle Ground*, 275. White also explains that the local commanders fell into one of two categories: they did not have the aid to give or, having aid, they did not want to give it to the locals. The result was that the Algonquians saw the British refusing to aid them in their time of need.

³⁸ White, *The Middle Ground*, 275.

³⁹ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 538

⁴⁰ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 545.

Additionally, the Algonquians did not understand how it was possible that British colonists were now settling Algonquian land since they had not lost to the British in war.

Pontiac's Rebellion further illuminated the extent to which the British did not sufficiently understand the Amerindians. The British felt the rebellion was simply a French plot to regain lost territories. Yet, the rebellion was a great deal more than just some French conspiracy. The rebellion was the Algonquian response to "conquest, white encroachment and [British Amerindian] policies..."⁴¹ Their response was possible because all the tribes of the pays d'en haut were joined together through a spiritual desire to return to their pre-contact way of life. Realizing they were not strong enough to repel the British, the tribes prayed that the "Great Spirit" would help.

The Algonquians did not exactly receive answers to their prayers in the fashion they had hoped. The French did not return to "liberate" them. Nor did the nativist return to the olden days occur; the British also did not leave the pays d'en haut.⁴² Instead, the British gradually recognized the error of their ways and sought to repair their relations with the Algonquian. Unfortunately, this took three years of conflict. At the conclusion of Pontiac's Rebellion, the reasons the Algonquian failed to unify previously re-emerged. The Algonquian were never one people operating in unison. Once the unifying factor of harsh British rule was removed, the Algonquian resumed in their intra-tribal conflicts.

Ironically, the British believed they could unify all the pays d'en haut by making Pontiac "leader" of the Algonquian people. The British elevated Pontiac to the level of chief to establish an Iroquois-like relationship with the Algonquians; but unfortunately for Pontiac and the British, the Algonquians did not want a chief, let alone one chosen by Britain. Algonquians rebuked Pontiac and forced him into exile. When the British finally recognized they were not able to create a pays d'en haut nation, they attempted to "imitate the French system of gifts and medals ... [and] instituted regulated trade. [French fathers] were replaced...with British fathers."⁴³ Over time, this method of

⁴¹ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 546.

⁴² White, *The Middle Ground*, 289.

⁴³ White, *The Middle Ground*, 315.

interaction proved too expensive and the British colonial government did not receive sufficient funding for such lavish endeavors. Additionally, the “cultural and social middle ground on which the alliance must finally rest,” never solidified.⁴⁴

Unable to create an environment of harmony and a sense of family, the British eventually reverted to destabilizing the Algonquians by focusing Algonquian attacks against each other instead of against the British. The uneasy peace continued. Unlike the French settlers of the past who integrated into Algonquian society, British settlers simply claimed land and threatened Amerindian families and well-being. The British colonial government thereby lost control of both sides. The friction created was destined to erupt into yet another, more bloody and costly rebellion; this second Indian rebellion was thwarted not through British control but through a lack of British control in the form of colonial rebellion. The British colonists (now Americans) took up arms against the British crown over the levying of new taxes (ironically, taxes levied to provide troops to protect the colonists from the Amerindians). The pays d'en haut Algonquians as well as other Amerindians again had the opportunity to choose sides. Although, the American Revolution (1775–1783) did not result in a restoration of Algonquian lands in the pays d'en haut, the war did answer Algonquian prayers that another white power would come along to counterbalance the British. The main lesson the British did take away from their efforts in North America was that “to assert direct sovereignty...to render the Indians docile and industrious...”⁴⁵ was not feasible or possible.

⁴⁴ White, *The Middle Ground*, 315.

⁴⁵ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 634.

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III. GREAT BRITAIN IN INDIA

As in North America, France and Britain sought to expand their control in South Asia. Both countries viewed the Indian subcontinent as a resource rich land. Unlike North America, France and Britain did not plan to settle India; they looked to further their commercial interests. Neither government had the capacity to support the massive outlays required to span the globe in search of resources and trade. Because of this limitation, chartered companies were formed to undertake these tasks. Chartered companies were private entities that received funding from investors and obtained rights and powers from the sovereign (head of state). D.K. Fieldhouse describes in *The Colonial Empires* how chartered companies became the best fit for European commercial interests in the East. Fieldhouse cites three particular benefits that accrued from utilizing chartered companies: “1) monopoly of trade between the company’s country and the east, 2) founded with private capital and, 3) the company goal was acquisition of wealth through trade not imperialism.”⁴⁶ These three goals formed the foundation for European expansion in India. The French Compagnie located its bases in Pondicherry (headquarters), Chandanagar, Yanam, Mahe, and Karaikal; British trading company bases were in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta.⁴⁷ Just as in North America, neither European nation had initial supremacy upon arrival.

The Europeans arrived as the existing Mughal Empire was unraveling. The Mughals were descendants of the Timurid; they were a “dynasty of interlopers who had founded their Indian empire in the mid-sixteenth century, and whose pedigree stretched back to the fourteenth-century conqueror, Timur the Great (Tamburlaine).”⁴⁸ These “interlopers” established Muslim rule over Hindu peoples. Although there was the appearance of total control, the Mughals based their control on the emperor’s mastery of

⁴⁶ D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires; a Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), 144.

⁴⁷ Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 15-16.

⁴⁸ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 4.

statecraft vis-a-vis subordinate Hindu rulers. This mastery ended in 1707 with the death of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.⁴⁹ Subsequent emperors were inept (or unable) to manage their sub-rulers. As the empire declined, the provinces became independent in practice, but still acknowledged de jure Mughal control.⁵⁰

The many subordinate Nizams-ul-Mulk (Administrator of the Realm) and Nawabs (Provincial Governors) headed what amounted to independent states.⁵¹ The major powers in the central and southern portions of India were the Marathas. Maratha chiefs began as Hindus who rebelled against Mughal expansion. The British thought of them “as a ragbag of conflicting anarchies” because the Marathas had no unity of government (not politically, legally, or fiscally).⁵² Although the British disparaged them, nevertheless the Marathas posed “the greatest threat to their commercial tranquility because of their predatory instincts, aggressive dynamism, and high mobility which facilitated strategic surprise.”⁵³

As Lawrence James explains in *British Raj*, the Marathas “dominated a broad swathe of land which stretched from the Sutlej in the north across the Deccan to the frontiers of Hyderabad and Mysore.”⁵⁴ The leaders (princes) of the Marathas, “loosely joined in a confederation, found it almost impossible to act together politically and militarily.”⁵⁵ Their original existence was as overlords levying “taxes” on their vassals. Only gradually did Maratha chiefs evolve “into definite sovereigns of territorial states, intensely militaristic, and ever ready to pick quarrels with their neighbors and with each

⁴⁹ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 6.

⁵⁰ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 163.

⁵¹ Edward John Thompson and G. T. Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1934), 62-63; Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 163; and James Alexander Williamson, *Short History of British Expansion: The Old Colonial Empire* (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1945), 364.

⁵² James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 69.

⁵³ G. J. Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India.” *The Journal of Military History* 68 (2004): 437.

⁵⁴ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 69.

⁵⁵ Bryant, “Asymmetric Warfare,” 437.

other.”⁵⁶ During this transformation, the Maratha confederacy continued to “tax” those in their territories as well as to plunder and raid neighboring provinces; these actions further weakened the empire as well as forced provinces to continue distancing themselves from the Mughals.

According to Sir A.C. Lyall in *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India*, during the disintegration of the Mughal Empire:

The Indian people were becoming a masterless multitude swaying to and fro in the political storm and clinging to any power, natural or supernatural, that seemed likely to protect them. They were prepared to acquiesce in the assumption of authority by anyone who could show himself able to discharge the most elementary functions of government in the preservation of life and property. In short, the people were scattered without a leader or protector; while the political system under which they had long lived was disappearing in complete disorganization.⁵⁷

The Indians no longer looked to the Mughals as the balancing force on the subcontinent; they awaited a new power to align the many conflicting states.

As in North America, the major competitors by the late seventeenth century in India were France and Britain. Neither European state retained sole control over Indian trade. British inability to dislodge Dutch control of the East Indies shifted their focus from the East Indies to India. In *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt cite 1623 as the year when waning British influence in the East Indies caused them to redirect their attention toward India. Also seeking to penetrate the Asian trade routes, France revived its East Indie Compagnie. The simultaneous decline of the Mughal Empire left the British, French, and Marathas “face to face as

⁵⁶ James Alexander Williamson, *Short History of British Expansion: The Modern Empire and Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan 1945), 134.

⁵⁷ Sir A.C. Lyall, *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India* (London: Macmillan and Co 1910), 64-65 as cited in James Alexander Williamson, *Short History of British Expansion: The Old Colonial Empire*. (London: Macmillan, 1945), 364.

contestants for India's sovereignty."⁵⁸ The Marathas filled a power vacuum in the areas they "controlled," but were not able to bring the entire empire under their suzerainty. Interestingly enough, neither of the European players initially sought to completely replace the Mughals either.

At first, the French and British companies refrained from meddling in Indian affairs; they also avoided being dragged into conflict with each other when fighting occurred in Europe. Their main goal was to avoid conflict and its subsequent fortification requirements. The purpose of the European factories was to make a profit. Battles and skirmishes (as well as preparing for them) reduced profits. However, this mindset would not last forever. India's continued descent into instability created an environment in which European neutrality could not last.⁵⁹ The first major shift occurred when the French Compagnie sought to increase revenue via "the rights of taxation which went with the ownership of [Indian] territory."⁶⁰ Territorial expansion as a revenue generator coupled with more European forces arriving in the Indian Ocean increased frictions; newly arriving British and French naval forces stoked nationalistic biases in the Europeans residing in India. Seizing on the French Compagnie officials allied with India Nawabs in the Carnatic region around Pondicherry. The Indian troops, led by French company officers, attacked and defeated the minimally defended British Company city of Madras. The initial French success came to too little, however. In 1748, the British overcame their defeat thanks to "greater military and financial resource." Britons also came to play "Indian politics as effectively as [the French]."⁶¹ The next round of

⁵⁸ Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, 16. Thompson and Garratt describe the establishment of the British East India Company in the Persian Gulf and India through conflict and consolidation with its Portuguese and Dutch rivals. The friction and conflict between British and other European powers did not cease in 1623. British interests continued to fight with Portuguese and Dutch throughout much of the 17th century. In 1662, Britain and Portugal merged their interests with the royal marriage of Charles II to Catherine of Braganza p30. But this only quelled the violence between Britain and Portugal. British and Dutch conflict continued until 1689 when William Prince of Orange (Netherlands) became William III, King of England, Scotland and Ireland. Refer to Williamson Short History: The Old Colonial Empire Chapter VI "The East India Company, 1600 – 1657, for British exploits against the Portuguese and Dutch.

⁵⁹ Williamson, *Short History: The Old Colonial Empire*, 364.

⁶⁰ Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, 17.

⁶¹ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 165.

hostilities grouped inside King George's War (a.k.a., The War of Austrian Succession 1744–48) concluded with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). Unfortunately, this peace merely ended hostilities; the peace terms did not resolve any of the antebellum issues “upon which Great Britain had fought [France].”⁶²

The uneasy peace did not last long in India. Both sides aligned against the other via local Indian rivals, and shortly after the “peace” of 1748, British and French company forces were at war again via their Indian allies. The tense situation resulted in both sides having “more troops in India than they cared to have...but neither dared disarm...”⁶³ The availability of arms allowed each side “to offer” the services of their troops in Indian succession disputes; the monetary compensation from the Indians aided in their cost reductions.⁶⁴ In 1754, French Compagnie directors in France sought to reverse the policy of intervention and encourage peace between all parties (French, British, and Indian factions). But whatever fragile peace was secured again crumbled, this time thanks to Anglo-French conflagrations in the forests of North America.

France and Britain entered into another war. The Seven Years War (1763), latter dubbed the first “world war,” determined which nation would be dominant in the world. Both countries fought for their interests in North America, the West Indies, Europe, Southwest Asia, and South Asia. This war marked the beginning of British domination on the Indian subcontinent. The Peace of Paris (1783) returned to France its main Indian bases, but the terms of the treaty called for base fortifications to be destroyed and never rebuilt. Defenseless bases ended the likelihood of the French staging a resurgence in India. Indian leaders realized French forces could no longer counterbalance British forces. The British continued to worry about French intervention, but chances of this diminished as Britain’s naval power eclipsed France’s power at sea. Even with a diminished French presence, peaceful existence in India proved illusory. France sought to regain a foothold in India during its subsequent wars with Britain (The American

⁶² Williamson, *Short History: The Old Colonial Empire*, 390.

⁶³ Williamson, *Short History: The Old Colonial Empire*, 369.

⁶⁴ For further information on European intervention, see Williamson, *Short History: The Old Colonial Empire*, 370-372 and James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 21–28.

Revolution 1775–1783, and The Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815). In 1782–83, France almost re-established a stronghold, but the Treaty of Paris (1783) returned India to the status quo antebellum. After 1815, France never again seriously challenged British supremacy in India.⁶⁵

Although France posed no threat after 1815, the Anglo-French struggle prior to 1815 set in motion policies and actions that consciously (as well as unconsciously) “launched the British... on a policy of Indian alliances and territorial expansion from which there was no return.”⁶⁶ The British capitalized on the French absence to extend their influence in the Carnatic region. Simultaneously, the British became the de facto rulers of Bengal. During the Seven Years War, the British sought to protect their base in Calcutta, Fort William. Aware of British manipulation in the Carnatic region, the Nawab of Bengal did not want them interfering in his realm. Nevertheless, with the aid of the Nawab’s political enemies, the British defeated him. Although the British did not become the official rulers of Bengal, the British East India Company officials controlled the region by using the Nawab as a puppet. Essentially, the British grafted their leadership on to the pre-existing political structures in Bengal. Again worth reiterating is that the conquest of India was not Britain’s conscious goal. The British instead acted to secure their trade bases and routes. These actions were tactics that when grouped together, yielded what looks like a strategy; the British company executed a “series of tactical decisions made in response to local and sometimes unexpected crises.”⁶⁷

British alliances with local Indian rulers survived even after the French presence diminished. Indian allies thus called upon the British when they went to war with rival Indian factions. By the early 1800s, without necessarily intending to, Britain transitioned from accidental occupier to purpose driven conquistador. Alliances drove expansion and expansion led to new alliances. As victories over rivals brought new territories into the British sphere of influence, new neighbors made for new rivals. The more new allies the

⁶⁵ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 166 and Williamson, *Short History: The Old Colonial Empire*, 415–416.

⁶⁶ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 166.

⁶⁷ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 63.

British acquired, and the more rivals they defeated, the more this enhanced perceptions of British invincibility. This contributed to further expansion. With every battlefield victory, the “British prestige soared. If, for some reason, British forces were overcome or forced to retire, Britain’s standing was diminished throughout India.”⁶⁸

The reality of control and power rested upon the perception of British supremacy over all. By 1818, the British had subjugated India’s two major powers, the Nawab of Bengal and Maratha Confederacy. The British ruled Bengal from behind the scenes and controlled “all [Maratha lands] necessary for security...”⁶⁹ From these two areas, Britain consolidated its power and expanded outwards. The hundred years from 1757–1857 witnessed the British conquest of the entire Indian sub-continent.⁷⁰

Victorious on the field of battle, Britons needed to follow this up with effective governance. Without a compliant Indian population, the British would not be able to maintain control over them. Their two options were direct and indirect rule. Direct rule required Britons function as the ruling authority; indirect rule allowed native rulers and princes to maintain authority so long as their actions met the approval of British administrators. Because of India’s geographical vastness and given the varied timing and methods of conquest, the British controlled India via both methods. In areas with a strong British presence (i.e., Bengal), the British applied direct rule. Remote areas (i.e., Hyderabad) with a sparse British presence defaulted to the indirect method. Regardless of the method of control, everyone answered to the Governor-General (after 1858, the Viceroy) and ultimate authority originated from the Company headquarters in London.⁷¹

Although initial control was exerted by a chartered company, the British East Indian Company, events, and perceived (and actual) mismanagement led to eventual takeover by the British government. Concerned officials sought to rein in the Company’s

⁶⁸ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 64-5.

⁶⁹ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 169–170

⁷⁰ For details of specific conquests see Williamson, *Short History: The Modern Empire and Commonwealth*, 133-145; James, *Raj*, 63- 150; Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, 168-365.; and Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 168–170.

⁷¹ Given the time for instructions to travel from London to India, London’s primary representative in India exerted considerable authority. Still he took his directions and orders from London.

dealings in India. Corruption and adventurism overcame Company officials' better judgment. The Regulation Act of 1773 attempted to rid the Company of corruption by increasing the Company Governor-General's reliance on the British government.⁷² This act proved to be ineffective; although the Governor was a parliament appointee, he still answered to the Company. Ten years after the Regulation Act of 1773, Parliament sought to transfer complete Indian sovereignty to the British government. The initial legislation failed; a year later parliament enacted the India Bill of 1784. The Company retained control over trade and Indian patronage, but all other matters (civil, military, and revenue collection) were transferred to a governmental Board of Control.⁷³ The aim with this system of rule was to govern British India more efficiently; hindsight demonstrates, however, that "this dual system was illogical, but worked well and lasted until 1858."⁷⁴ The new arrangements decoupled the administrative and commercial components of rule.

From the enactment of the India Bill in 1784 until 1858, the British sought to bring the Indian population into the modern era. The drive toward modernity affected many aspects of Indian life. The intent was to reorganize Indian society to better mirror British society. It was felt this realignment would enable the Indians to more easily transition towards a modern existence. The scope of the changes introduced affected religion, governance, taxation, land reform, wealth, titles, etc.⁷⁵ But such a swift march toward progress became more than many Indians could accept. The breaking point came in May of 1857. By this point the "passion for reform and change was out of control and Indians had more change than they could absorb."⁷⁶ Relations around the country were tense; one British official in India said he "sensed that something was wrong, although [he] could not say exactly what."⁷⁷ The spark that kindled the revolt came from of an

⁷² Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 171.

⁷³ Williamson, *Short History: The Old Colonial Empire*, 417. This section of Williamson's book as well as Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, 171, contain further details of the governmental oversight.

⁷⁴ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, 171

⁷⁵ For descriptions of reforms see James, *Raj*, 151–232.

⁷⁶ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 223.

⁷⁷ James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 223.

Army mutiny. The mutineers stormed Delhi and proclaimed the Mughal Emperor, not the British, the ruler of India. Without any prior coordination, many disgruntled Indian soldiers and civilians joined the revolt.⁷⁸ It took eighteen months for the British to fully stamp out the revolt. Hindsight reveals that there was probably little chance for success given the fractured nature of the groups involved in the mutiny. However, there were a few months after May 1857 when the revolt could have exploded into a wider war had the various factions united under one leader.⁷⁹

Although the mutineers did not succeed, the revolt caused the British to implement significant changes to their rule. While still fighting to put down remnants of the revolt, the British government enacted the Government of India Act of 1858. This act dissolved the East India Company's charter and transferred all its assets to the British Crown. All Indian affairs handled by the Company were transferred to a government council headed by the Secretary of State for India. The new head official in India was elevated from Governor-General to Viceroy. The British government assumed full responsibility for India. Although British repression of the Mutiny and subsequent transfer of sole authority to the Crown addressed the most visible issues, underlying reasons for disgruntlement remained and continued to drive a wedge between British rulers and Indian subjects. Although the revolt itself did not succeed in liberating Indians in 1857, the Mutiny marked the point from which days of British rule were numbered. Less than a century later, the Indians were still seeking independence. Instead of the unorganized violence of 1857, Indians unified via civil disobedience in 1947, forcing the British out of India for good.

⁷⁸ For details that led up to the Mutiny as well as the events of the Mutiny see James, *Raj* 233-277 and Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* 435–458.

⁷⁹ Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, 438.

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IV. CONCLUSION

At this point one might ask, “What is relevant to U.S. foreign policy about studying two instances of British imperial history?” Even though British and U.S. ideas about foreign expansion differ, one can still learn lessons about exerting control and/or influence abroad by studying British experiences. The two case studies examined in Chapters II and III above offer a broad-stroke overview of British efforts to exert control in North America and India. The bodies of literature for both North America and Indian history are voluminous. Nonetheless, even a quick tour through some of the literature suggests ways in which past British experiences might aid the U.S. in its near term and future interactions with weak states and/or tribal societies.

The current international system developed in the aftermath of the Second World War (1939–1945). Prior to World War II, a small number of Western European and North American states (as well as Russia and Japan) controlled international relations. There was no formal international body through which great powers could have their disputes arbitrated. The absence of such a body was one of the contributing factors to renewed conflict in the 1930s and 1940s. The new international system, which rose from the ashes of these tumultuous decades, resurrected and improved on the idea of a League of Nations. Although there were ideological and regime differences between the U.S. and its main adversary, Soviet Russia, both sides agreed about the nation-state as the unit of account. The world’s nation-states were divided into two camps: those in the U.S. camp supported a democratic/free market economy, and those in the Soviet camp supported a communist/central command economy. Both camps used the nation-state as the basic unit upon which to build and control alliances.

In order to connect the idea that internal notions of social control can be used for external (international) control purposes as well, one needs to refer to Lebow and Kelly’s “Thucydides and Hegemony;” this is an example of internal ideas of social control and legitimacy applied to external ideas. Lebow and Kelly explain:

To secure and maintain the voluntary compliance of allies or subjects, [arkhe] need to behave in a manner consistent with their claims and professed values. They must forego short-term gains that threaten the longer-term stability and survival of their alliance...⁸⁰

Just as nation-states require legitimacy from their society, the societies of the world must believe in international institutions for them to be legitimate. As Bruce Gilley points out in *The Right to Rule*, the “international system must serve political legitimacy, which remains within the ambit of states.”⁸¹ Legitimacy thus depends on all involved, both locally and internationally, believing and supporting this political legitimacy. The difficulties come when different two societal types interact.

Coming full circle, this returns the thesis to Lugard’s ideas about governance outlined in the first chapter. The three types of governance—self-government; self-government under a native ruler with non-native councilors and administrators; and rule by a native chief unfettered in his control of his people, but subordinate to control by the protecting power—offer three varieties of control.⁸² Self-government assumes that traditional societies are ready to become modern societies; this transformation, in turn, permits the new nation-state to be governed by the rule-set recognized by the existing international system. Yet, as Lugard noted, self-governance was not a realistic solution for most. He cited challenges inherent in “numerous separate tribes, speaking different languages, in different stages of societal development...”⁸³ He recognized that a complete shift from traditional governance to a modern republic or constitutional monarchy would prove disastrous. He did acknowledge India’s “experiment” with self-governance. When Lugard penned his book, India resided firmly in the British realm. Since then, India broke free from British domination and is today the world’s largest democracy. The important point to take away is that Britain did not immediately allow

⁸⁰ Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, "Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United States." *Review of International Studies* 27(2001): 594, <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed July 21, 2009), 595–596. Lebow and Kelly use hegemon as ancient Greeks used the word arkhe (political control).

⁸¹ Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 215–216

⁸² Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 194–197.

⁸³ Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 195.

complete self-governance in India. Indians ran the government and its associated administrative functions *with* British oversight.⁸⁴ India's example suggests self-government can be a viable option, but traditional societies require internal and/or external forcing functions to compel them to shed their traditional forms of governance.

Self-government via a native ruler with non-native influence and oversight is known as direct rule. The government puts on a literal native face. A native rules, but is guided by non-natives. According to Lugard, only advanced communities were capable of this. He recognized the lack of fit between this type of control and traditional societies at the tribal level. Possessing the structures or at least some of the structures of a state is a prerequisite. As seen in the Indian case study, the British easily assumed control of Bengal via this method. The Nawab of Bengal retained his "authority," but British officials guided him in directions that most benefited them.

In contrast to direct rule is indirect rule; indirect rule is rule by a native ruler under the control of the protecting power. The native ruler proves able to overcome internal rivals thanks to his external supporter; in return, the native ruler obeys his supporter's wishes. To some extent, this describes the early Anglo-Iroquois relations. The British tilted the balance of power among the Iroquois to the Anglophile members of the Iroquois Great Council; subsequently, these council members controlled Iroquois internal and external policies. Thanks to this relationship and with the aid of British weaponry, the Iroquois expanded their area of dominion. By doing this, Britain retained a strong ally that would do its bidding in North America.

Using Lugard's examples and the case studies, it is possible to consider how the U.S. might better apply its power. The default instinct of the U.S. seems to be to mold other societies into nation-states in its own image. Although this is one option available, it might not always be the best fit for the society in question. In *After War*, Christopher Coyne explains how the "U.S. has attempted to export Western style democracy via military occupation numerous times over the past century, but ironically, policymakers

⁸⁴ Another important point to remember is that Britain itself was in the process of an evolution in its system of governance from the 1600s to the 1900s. Not surprisingly, the methods it chose for the societies under its control were closely associated with the way Britons viewed governance at home and at different times.

have neglected the factors that have allowed these institutions to sustain [themselves] over the long run in their home country.”⁸⁵ Coyne’s implication is that U.S. society created institutions that most suited it; it was not institutions that created society. U.S. institutions work for Americans because Americans do not “sacrifice their own self-interests for that of the larger community, but rather ...realize....that his or her private interests are directly connected to the interests of the larger group and community.”⁸⁶ Coyne calls this the art of association. These associations between people, as well as between the people and the government, are crucial when assessing what is most likely to work for other societies.

Looking to the case studies, one can see how important mechanisms of rule or control are, and why it is important they fit each society’s norms and traditions. In the North American example, the Five Nations progressed from individual villages to a confederation of tribes. The confederation had a tribal council that made decisions for all tribes under its banner. The pre-contact nature of this council made it organic and not alien to the Iroquois. The British made military and commercial covenants with the Iroquois via this council. The practice of leaders speaking for the Five Nations allowed the British to better control the area. Instead of negotiating with hundreds of village leaders, Britons simply controlled influential council members. These members in turn controlled the council and the council’s legitimacy enabled them to ‘control’ the Five Nations.

Conversely, the Algonquian tribes formed no national councils. A few individuals led each village. Being led by a national council or chief, was an alien concept. The Algonquians followed different leaders at different times. The British tried and failed to force a chief upon them. After putting down Pontiac’s Rebellion, the British sought to create an Algonquian confederacy. Instead of borrowing the Iroquois council model, the British sought to make the rebellion’s leader, Pontiac, chief over the

⁸⁵ Christopher J, Coyne , *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2008), 51.

⁸⁶ Coyne, *After War*, 52.

Algonquian people. Although Pontiac was not foreign to them, the idea of a chief was foreign. The British attempt to elevate Pontiac also tainted his legitimacy. Algonquians saw him for what he was, a puppet.

From these interactions and events, one can conclude that it is most beneficial to control traditional societies via a select few who legitimately govern the nation. The challenge is to guide a nation away from being a collection of many autonomous villages toward having some mechanism of effective central control. Lugard's advice was "to clothe [the] principles in the garb of evolution not of revolution."⁸⁷ The trick was to make members of the society believe change resulted from their desire and not from an external force.

Changing a society against its will is a monumental undertaking for any member of that society, let alone for a non-member. The British consciously and unconsciously understood the importance of using pre-existing regimes and governments to maintain control over populations in India. British rule via both direct and indirect methods in India was based on necessity rather than design. The projection of legitimate control via these two methods served them well. The British style of governance was little different from that of the Mughals. By keeping pre-existing social structures, the British were able to maintain the balance between the governed and the governors.

Although the British had to subdue various elements around the Indian subcontinent, a major uprising did occur due to the introduction of social changes. This uprising occurred when the British sought to change Indian social norms and interactions. The thinking was that in order to make the Indians more modern, they needed to be British. One goal in making the Indians modern was this would allow the Indians to achieve Lugard's first type of control, self-governance. However, the social changes required to achieve this led to the Mutiny of 1857.

The British formed relationships with non-Western societies against the backdrop of great power competition in both North America and India. British relationships were formed as a counterbalance to French local influence. Understandably, local societies played the two powers against each other. Ironically, it was when the French option

⁸⁷ Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 194.

faded as a counterbalance that the British had the most difficulty controlling locals. Thinking they had a freer hand to do as they pleased proved to be unwise. The situation required *more* attention because factions were no longer divided into just two camps (pro-British and pro-French); the factions splintered with every group for itself. This situation called for *more* troops in North America to defend against the Amerindians and for *more* conquest and *more* alliances in India to subdue the belligerent princes and nawabs. Each course of action resulted in a deeper entanglement and an inability to sever undesirable associations. The American Revolution and Britain's subsequent loss of a significant portion of its North American colonies was the result of more troops (and associated taxes) in North America. The subjugation of the Indian subcontinent resulted from continued British expansion. In both cases, there was no clear-cut plan to facilitate a withdrawal when the situation was more costly than beneficial.

From these observations, it should be possible to formulate a few takeaways to help govern U.S. interactions with weak state nations and tribal societies that produce positive policy results for the U.S. By no means should these lessons be considered all-inclusive. They merely represent a starting point for further exploration on how best to focus native efforts towards desire U.S. outcomes.

The first lesson is to understand there will be pre-existing rivalries and power struggles upon U.S. arrival anywhere. Any U.S. attempt at neutrality is futile. Eventually one side will favor the U.S. and the other side will oppose the U.S. Examples can be seen in both case studies. The Iroquois and the Algonquian were already pitted against each other when the British arrived. Not only were there external, inter-tribal Amerindian tribal rivalries, one can also see internal, intra-tribal rivalries in both groups. The Iroquois Nation almost imploded into civil war when the various factions (Anglo, Franco, and neutral) vied with each other for control. In the India case study, the Marathas were one group that formed to thwart Mughal expansion in central India. Not only does one see friction between rival Indian groups, one also sees internecine friction. The Nawab of Bengal was removed from power due to the fissures between him and the elites in his court. The British were able to exploit this division because they were aware of its existence.

Pre-engagement ethnographic intelligence (if available) should help the U.S. from walking into situations blind. Clear understanding of the situation –for instance, identification of key power players, rivalries, causes of rivalries, etc—should enable U.S. representatives to maintain an upper hand while avoiding various pitfalls. The U.S. should not blindly choose sides. Nor should it choose sides immediately. Eventually, the U.S. needs to back one side. The key to choosing a side is remembering that the U.S. is not wedded to this side forever. Once the society develops its state, regime, and government, the U.S. needs to respect that country’s political process. Knowing when to step back is critically important.

Second, the U.S. must remain in the background, not the foreground. Again returning to Lugard, the U.S. needs “to make it apparent alike to the educated native, the conservative Moslem, and the primitive pagan, each in his own degree, that the policy is not antagonistic but progressive—sympathetic to his aspirations and the guardian of his natural rights.”⁸⁸ Remaining in the background seems to be counter to what the British did. Most of their actions placed them in the foreground in order to control the locals. The placement of British officials in the foreground gave local antagonists the perfect focal point upon which to rally local dissention. In the Amerindian case study, the Mingos looked to the British for aid and not other Algonquians because the British were in the foreground. The British refusal to assistance provided further fodder for nativists to rally their supports. If the British had remained in the background and supplied aid through other Algonquians, the nativists would not have been able to focus most Algonquians against a common foe, the British.

No one likes others to tell him what to do. Most Americans dislike the policies that are formulated in Washington; why should non-Americans under U.S. control be any different? Every major event and milestone should reflect a local input. There are times when this may not be possible, but every effort needs to be made to promote and use local-born solutions and actions. Let the locals be the locals. Additionally, the U.S. advisors should do just that: “advise.” An advisor is an individual from whom one seeks guidance. An advisor should never dictate a plan of action. U.S. officials should only

⁸⁸ Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 194.

intervene when policies and practices are contrary to U.S. interests. This accomplishes two goals: 1) the locals see their government—not the foreigners—providing for them (which bolster its legitimacy); 2) the government becomes self-reliant and does not require U.S. help in every instance. One does need to be prepared, however, for when the locals say no. Even when the U.S. has had significant military presences inside other nations, these host nations have taken actions contrary to U.S. interests.

Third, the U.S. needs to understand actions taken today can have significant complicating effects tomorrow. Fifty plus years ago, the U.S. made decisions and actions in the interests of that time. Some of the actions sown then have led to disastrous results today. This thesis is not arguing that every decision and action must be assessed for all its potential effects. U.S. policy makers need to make decisions that have positive results at the time. But, they also need to be aware of people's collective memories when returning to an area or approaching societies after there has been a major international power shift.

The fourth lesson to bear in mind is to understand each society's specific art of association (the way in which people interact with each other and institutions) as it applies to their ideas about governance. In both case studies, the Algonquians (during Pontiac's Rebellion) and the Indians (during the Mutiny of 1857) rebelled against the British when alien ideas or rules were imposed. The U.S., since its birth, has been the benchmark for all nations striving to be mature liberal democracies. The irony is the U.S. is not a democracy; it is a representative republic. Our founders realized that the American art of association required checks and balances not only for the branches of government, but also for or on people. Americans forget that when its constitution was penned most of its citizens were not eligible to vote; even though all men were created equal, some men remained in bondage. All too often the U.S. desires societies elsewhere to spontaneously transform themselves into mature liberal democracies like itself. This overlooks one detail; the current U.S. art of association took more than two hundred years to mature into its present form. The true brilliance Americans should export is the example of founding documents that established an ideal and expectations for future generations to strive to meet/to live up to. This is more fitting for other people then trying to adopt the actual American art of association. This is how the U.S. needs to help

transformations occur: understand the art of association for *that* society. Understand that other people will not immediately shed their ways. Have the kind of patience and foresight that made our founders heroic to all Americans. The U.S. should try to guide other societies on a path that best fits them for their journey from the here and now to their equivalent of a mature liberal democracy.

As stated above, these lessons are not a recipe for guaranteed success. One cannot simply add two parts of this, half a cup of that, mix, cook for forty-five minutes in the oven, and serve to guests for their enjoyment. The efforts above require a chef, not a cook. A chef is someone who can take stock of his local ingredients and make a superb dish; a cook follows the recipe by substituting local ingredients that do not have the same composition and flavor as the non-local ingredients that are familiar to him. The ideas presented here are designed to help make U.S. cooks think more like chefs. The U.S. for the foreseeable future will need agility to operate in all types of regions, communities, and societies. Success depends not only on how well the U.S. controls its environment via alliances but also how well it is able to pacify and to incorporate the tribes that still lie without.

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